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OR DEMOCRATIC INEQUALITY?
A CASE OF THE FORMER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
There is a lot of research on the relation between political democracy 
and income distribution and the correlation between economic growth 
and presence of a democratic regime based of cross country data but it has 
failed to fi nd any robust relationship between inequality and democracy 
(Bollen and Jackman, 1985; Li et al, 1998). Or, to be precise, Milanovich 
and Gradstein came to the conclusion that -- there is a relatively weak 
effect of democracy on inequality (seldom statistically signifi cant when 
controlled for other factors); the effect is particular weak for presidential 
systems (parlamentary systems are more pro-equality).
Relations between economic growth and inequality remains unclear. 
Bigsten and Levin (2001) argue that countries that have been successful 
in terms of economic growth are also more likely to have been successful 
in reducing poverty. There is no constant relationship between growth 
and changes in inequality.
On the contrary, Clarke (2001) stressed that inequality is negatively 
correlated with growth. However, the correlation between inequality and 
growth is not dependent upon whether the government is a democracy 
or a non-democracy. Boix (2000) suggested that the positive impact of 
economic growth in introduction of democracy is conditional upon the 
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The situation becomes even more complicated if the experience of 
transitional economies are taken into account-- Milanovich and Gradstein 
state that while democracy and inequality increased practically in all 
transitional economies, higher increases in democracy were associated 
with lower increases in inequality. In other parts of the world the 
conclusion drawn from the studies is just the opposite-- the increase in 
democracy corresponds to decrease in inequality.
This phenomenon gave rise to a number of studies. The analysis 
of the relevant literature made Gradstein et al (2001) to suggest that 
democratization affects inequality indirectly. The aim of this paper is to 
have a closer look at that such indirect factors might be and how they 
are likely to form links between democracy and inequality. This is not to 
say that there is no link between democracy and inequality at all rather 
that such relationship is by no way simple.
Limitations and problems of the analysis
From the beginning we would like to point out some important limitations 
of research on democracy and inequality. As limitations of existing methods of 
measuring inequality and democracy are well known and discussed elsewhere it 
seems necessary to focus mostly on specifi c problems related to collecting and 
interpreting data for the former socialist countries.
1) The data on inequality comes from statistics and surveys. And the most 
popular measure of income inequality is Gini coeffi cient. It should be stressed 
that income is one of the most widely used indicators to measure inequality as it 
is relatively easier to calculate and compare. It can be suggested that the nature of 
inequality would be exacerbated were we to employ a comprehensive defi nition 
of income and took into account all the benefi ts, even what governments failed 
to do.
As a result there is an evident tendency to adapt a narrow focus paying direct 
attention largely to a classical form of inequality, income inequality, while other 
dimensions of inequality that are not so easy to quantify are often overlooked (age, 
gender, ethnicity).
Among factors that can alter the offi cial estimates of income inequality in the 
former socialist countries the following should be mentioned fi rst of all.
· Informal economy and informal income that are not counted by the offi cial 
statistics. In the region discussed informal employment has always been a signifi cant 
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source of income and consumption. Employers avoid reporting wages to escape 
payroll taxation. However, while income from informal activity certainly helped to 
support living standards of the poor it appears to have benefi ted well off families 
more. In Russia, for example, according to some estimates, more than 70 per cent 
of informal income go to the richest 20 per cent. So, it is likely that informal income 
could substantially strengthen overall inequality in society. and should be taken into 
account when the effects of income distribution on equality are appraised.
· Occupational provisions as their exclusion from the total welfare distorts 
understanding of the real scope of inequality in different countries. In the region 
the role of employers in providing social welfare for employees has traditionally 
been quite substantial.
· Country houses and possibility for people to have products from their plots of 
land. This practice is particularly widespread in Russia and other CIS countries. It is 
mostly low income families who benefi t from consuming home produced goods.
The democracy is even more diffi cult to measure – in our paper we used 
Freedom House ratings for democratization, that is based on evaluating political 
rights and civil liberties. In fact, the diffi culty to quantify democracy makes it rather 
diffi cult to compare economic and “political” indicators, especially in a long term 
perspective and, therefore, the results of such comparisons should be treated with 
caution.
2) Comparative approach to the problem also poses certain diffi culties. Cross 
country comparisons are extremely diffi cult to carry on because information coming 
from the national sources may not be fully comparable. As a result, comparative 
inequality studies are mainly based on the data collected by international 
organizations, such as UNDP, UNESCO, World Bank that have suffi cient resources 
both human and fi nancial to carry out such type of work as well as a good access 
to national sources. However, there are often discrepancies in the data released 
by these agencies. One of the problems for the former socialist countries is that 
at the beginning of the transition period they changed their statistical systems to 
adapt them more to international standards and it is diffi cult to compare pre- and 
transition indicators.
Besides, the selection of countries for analysis also affects the results (see for 
example, Ivaschenko, 2001). In cross countries comparison that involve the large 
selection of countries (27 in our case) specifi c social and economic condition in 
which inequality might be embedded are missing. Therefore, it would be useful to 
supplement large scale comparisons with country specifi c case studies.
Our analysis reveals one more aspect that researches in the fi eld should think 
more about -- it soon might be unproductive to cluster former socialist countries 
together, however similar they seem to be in certain respects, especially taking 
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into account the coming EU accession of a number of East and Central European 
and Baltic states.
3) The issue of wealth is clearly central in the analysis of inequality, yet 
statistics on wealth are everywhere problematic. This can hardly been accidental 
since countries have special statistical bodies to collect information. Generally, 
income is more equitably distributed than wealth. While wealth distribution in 
most states remains very unequal the degree of inequality does vary from society 
to society. As a trend, wealth distribution became more unequal during the 80s-90s 
in most countries.
The problem: rising inequality in the former socialist countries
The UN report (1993) states that the Gini coeffi cient which is a measure of 
income inequality was lower in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union than in any 
other world region. In the former socialist countries distribution of income was 
quite egalitarian. For Central European countries Gini slightly increased-- maximum 
in Poland from 0.275 to 0.341, to Slovenia where Gini even slightly decreased. 
For the former Soviet Union, Gini demonstrates larger increases in all countries, 
except Belarus. The biggest values—about 0.400-- are for Kyrgizstan, Russia and 
Turkmenistan. (See Tables 1-4)
These data highlights three problems: fi rst, how substantial is inequality in 
the region, second, why inequality has increased during the transition period; and 
third, why inequality has increased unevenly across countries in question?
How deep is inequality in the region compared with other countries? Is Gini 
in the region in fact that high that gives cause for concern? Gini values of 0.25-0.35 
provide a benchmark as inequality in most industrialized countries falls within this 
range. Inequality in the region was at the lower end of this range at the start of 
transition but increased during the 1990s. In Hungary and Poland Gini remained 
close to the average in advanced industrialized countries. However, it is worth 
noting that there is a signifi cant trend to greater inequality in a modern world, 
both between and within the countries. At that the pattern of inequality remain 
stable-- rich countries are becoming richer, poor countries are becoming poorer. 
The same pattern applies to income groups within the countries. As to the country 
case, growing income inequality and volatility have characterized the US pattern of 
growth since the early 1970s. Reagan administration policies produced a massive 
concentration of wealth in a society already known for its inegalitarianism. The 
Gini for the USA was 40.8 in 1997, for the UK—36.0 in 1995. The ratio of the 
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richest 10 % to the poorest 10 % was 16.6 and 13.4, accordingly. At the same time 
poverty rates increased signifi cantly in many developed countries.
Besides, it seems that in some cases the lower inequality is not directly 
translated into more happiness in the society – for example, Slovenia, that is doing 
very well in equality with the lowest Gini in the region at the same time has the 
highest record of juvenile suicide.
How to explain that transition caused an increase in inequality? The two 
most conventional explanations come from evaluating the progress of economic 
reforms. According to the World Bank analysis (WB, 2000) very large increases 
in inequality were caused by a lack of reforms and by the so called state capture, 
the ability of the powerful groups to infl uence policy for their own enrichment. On 
the other hand, inequalities can be explained by the fact that people were able to 
avail themselves of new opportunities and whereby the rewards in the labor market 
became more closely related to education and skills ( UNICEF, 2000).
Transition to a market economy has resulted in major economic reversals in 
the former socialist countries. Economic decline has had an deleterious impact on 
social welfare-- unemployment has increased, incomes have fallen and poverty rates 
increased. The latter is one of the most important things that happened in income 
distribution and to our mind might be more important than the rise in inequlity.
The poverty headcount ratio rose sharply throughout the region. The situation 
is most dramatic in the former Soviet Union. In Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Tadjikistan, 
Armenia and Geogria more than half of population were defi ned as absolutely poor 
according to national standards. In Russia about 40 per cent of population lives 
below poverty line. Poverty might be even deeper as the threshold used (minimum 
basket) to measure poverty is itself low.
Households suffering from a greater depth of poverty are fi nding it increasingly 
diffi cult to emerge from it and are thus exposed for longer periods to all the risks that 
accompany extreme poverty. For many income poor material standards of living, 
including housing and access to services, still remain better than in other world 
countries with similar GDP per capita. However, as time pass their living conditions 
would deteriorate and they will not be able to maintain them the previous level.
Poverty in the region has a very strong psychological dimension -- many 
people have experienced collapse of values and believes, they are disoriented and 
suffer from social and economic insecurity fi nding it diffi cult to adapt to the new 
realities. A specifi c feature of poverty in the region is a weak correlation between 
poverty and level of education.
It is worth noting that income inequality is closely related to certain social 
conditions. For example, World Bank analysis suggests that more than 75 per cent 
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of the difference in child mortality across countries is associated with income 
differences. One of the most signifi cant developments in the world health in the 
late XX century is the decline in life expectancy in the former Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe. This situation is without precedent in modern history. Nowhere 
else has health worsened so seriously in peacetime among industrialized nations.
Former socialist countries are typically broadly divided into two main groups-
-countries of Eastern and Central Europe and CIS countries that are further divided 
into Western group (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova), Central Asia (Kazahkstan, 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tadjikistan), Caucusis Republics 
(Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan) and Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia). 
The leading region doing better than others includes Central European countries-
- Check Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia.
Though all the countries in the region have faced serious diffi culties during 
the transition period, there are signifi cant variations between the former communist 
countries. While Eastern European countries such as Poland and Hungary have 
been able to meet the basic needs of their citizens, this is not the case in some 
other countries where nutritional, health and housing standards remain poor when 
compared with the rest of Europe. Central Asia has faced additional challenges-
- low initial level of per capita income and rapid growing population and excess 
labor supply.
Why does the extent of inequality differ among the former socialist countries? 
Several tentative suggestions should be made here as suggested by statistical data 
and literature review.
· Initial conditions-- it is interesting to note that the grouping of the countries 
in question on inequality and other social indicators corresponds to their level 
of economic and social development at the start of reforms. The average GDP 
(per capita) in the former socialist countries is low but basic needs attainment 
is in general satisfactory in terms of life expectancy, infant mortality, nutritional 
standards, safe drinking water. But improvements in welfare in the region were not 
uniformly distributed between the countries. While levels of welfare were higher in 
Eastern Europe such as Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, they were lower in 
the Central Asian States and Southern European countries which remained socially 
and economically backward. In addition there were variations in levels of welfare 
by income groups within the countries.
· Uneven economic growth – it renewed in nearly all 27 countries starting 
from 1998. This positive development followed the prolonged period of decline 
and stagnation throughout the 1990s. However, the level of 1989 is reached by 
Check Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia only. Economic decline 
was steeper in CIS in 1990s than it was in Central and Eastern Europe.
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· The level of economic development – countries differ substantially as to 
per capita GDP. In 2001 it ranges from less than 1000 USD (Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Kyrgizstan, Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan, Moldova, Ukraine) to about 4000-
5000 USD ( Check Republick, Slovakia, Poland Hungary, Croatia), others following 
within this range ( the biggest GDP per capita is in Slovenia--9500 USD).
· Share of wages in income –as there is a negative correlation between 
inequality and the share of wages in income, higher share of wages and social 
transfers in Central European countries make them more equal societies.
· Public debt is another issue that is a challenge that must be faced in 
conjunction with the continued provision of quality public services. Several 
countries in the region may face external debt crisis with serious consequences for 
social expenditures ( Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan and Tadjikistan).
· Government policy, refl ected in government expenditures. Even if personal 
incomes do not change people may still be better off if the government increases its 
spendings on health, education and other public services. Government expenditures 
as percentage of GDP decreased in most countries by the end of the discussed 
period, in some countries quite dramatically (see Table 6).
· Degree of sovereignty is also mentioned when inequality issues are discussed. 
In Central and East European countries reforms were initiated from the bottom and 
thus they demonstrates much more commitment to equality than CIS countries, 
where reforms were started by elites.
· High corruption is correlated with high inequality. Allegedly, corruption is 
especially widespread in the countries of the former Soviet Union (see table 5).
Inequality, democratic values and political ideology
All the economic factors mentioned above, however important, do not 
provide the satisfactory explanation of inequality developments in the former 
socialist countries. As the most important development in the political life is 
democratization some researchers attempt not only to relate inequality to the 
degree of democratization in the countries in question but the fi nd more specifi c 
aspects that might effect inequality. That is why in search of plausible explanations 
of the raising inequality in the region they turned their mind to ideology and values 
characteristic of emerging societies.
Some experts do include ideology into the factors that infl uence inequality. 
Gradstein et al (2001) argued that democratization effect worked through ideology. 
In fact they distinguished two major factors-- democratization of political process 
and value of equality in society. Consequently, the two propositions that were 
put forwards were as follows: level of income inequality was expected to be 
low when political process is democratized than when it was controlled by rich 
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oligarchy; the more society value equity the less is the rise in inequality during 
democratization. In fact they suggested that social context and societal values as 
well as working of the political system were important determinants. For example, 
they argued that parlamentary systems are more likely to generate lower inequality 
than presidential.
Gradstein et al (2001) came to the conclusion that country dominant religion 
is related to inequality. They suggested that Muslim and Confucian societies has 
either small, or even positive effect on inequality, they are intrinsically more equal 
that the Judeo-Christian societies., for example strong family ties. As a result, 
democratization in Muslim societies leads to low increases in inequality.
Milanovich and Gradstein (2002) suggested that it is necessary to incorporate 
into analysis the prevailing ideology. They posed a question why did socialist 
countries characterized by a strong concentration of power exhibited very low levels 
of equality. They suggested that inequality is also a refl ection of social values, or 
the values hold by the elite.
We are more concerned with the political philosophy and ideology that in turn 
is translated in practical policies implemented by political parties in power, the way 
preferences of social agents and their political strategies infl uence inequality.
Several propositions should be made clear before we proceed to the discussion 
of the value of equality/inequality in modern political ideologies.
1) When we discuss the correlation between democracy and inequality fi rst 
of all it is necessary to understand what is meant by democracy. The problem is 
embedded into the wider context of the role of political system in economic and 
social development. Democracy can be view both in terms of values and political 
ideology and political mechanism, the tool of achieving certain aims. Its only visible 
advantage is that people allegedly can express their attitudes and choose policy 
they like for whatever reason.
Former socialist countries did became more democratic, but fi rst of all in 
the formal sense of democratic elections and in terms of providing for essential 
economic, civil and political rights. The famous World Bank book (2000) describes 
the state capture phenomenon that appeared in the former socialist countries -- 
control of the policy-making and legislative process by vested interests in collusion 
with those holding political power. Another widely used connotation is “rent seeking 
behavior” meaning the vested interest are able to redistribute resource in their 
interests.
The interaction between civil society and the government has much more 
implications for the implementation of democratic values rather than democratic 
mechanisms. All former socialist countries now have elections and more than one 
party but despite these facts according to Freedom House rating, some of them are 
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not doing well on democratic freedoms—Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan 
and Belarus are considered as consolidated autocracies, Azerbaijan, Tadjikistan and 
Kyrgizstan—as autocracies. All this make it diffi cult to believe that the essence of 
the new regimes is really democratic.
Probably this justifi es Lindenberg’s remark that “democratic regimes.. were as 
likely to administer strong economic medicine-- structural adjustment programmes 
-- as authoritarian regimes and were no more likely to be overthrown as a result of 
their efforts” (as cited in Social Capital, 2002)
Besides, two facts further complicate the analysis. On the one hand, data 
by Milanovich and Gradstein (2002, p.22) suggested that inequality is growing 
as the regime becomes less democratic ( the case of Belarus, Uzbekistan, and 
Turkmenistan) and visa versa, more democratic countries demonstrate less increase 
in inequality. But on the other hand, some countries do have almost the same Ginis 
but quite different scores in Freedom House ratings, for example, Slovenia and 
Belarus (see table 5).
2) The problem of inequality in modern society is inseparable of the problem 
of social justice, namely it is the extent of inequality that society accepts as just 
(fair) that matters. Measuring inequality, therefore, involves a moral judgment. 
There is a wide acceptance in the civilized world that some basic minimum standard 
of living should be available to all citizens. Beyond this views differ across the 
political spectrum about what is acceptable as inequality.
Saunders (1990 ) noted that it should be accepted that the modern society is 
unequal. It was important to decide what inequalities were just or unjust. Rawl’s 
famous second principle of justice reads as follows:
“ Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) 
reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions 
and offi ces open to all”. (Rawls, 1972: 60).
In the sense of Rawls’ comment that inequality in distribution of wealth and 
income should be consistent with equal citizenship and equal opportunity it might 
be argued that the Western societies can be considered as fair enough systems.
3) Milanovich and Gradstein (2002) suggested that the length of democratic 
experience should be incorporated into analysis and it might well happen that the 
rise of inequality in the former socialist countries is to be attributed to transitional 
period only and will not be characteristic of the new societies that are to emerge 
out of transition.
4) The value of equality in society has very important practical implications 
for both economic and social policy for it defi nes the role for government in 
public affairs and justifi cation of inequalities rather than taking them as natural 
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benefi cial and inevitable. Different political ideologies take different positions on 
the possibility to reach desirable social change through political action and the 
nature of the future society and the role of the state in achieving it. However, the 
problem of equality/equity is usually addressed from the concept of citizenship 
and social rights. The problem of equality and justice in society is expected to 
be solved by the state which is supposed to look after the fairness of treatment of 
different groups of population.
In discussing political ideologies we followed the European tradition and 
distinguished two major ideological streams-- the right and social democrats, that 
in our view are the most important today in forming political climate in Europe. We 
also included a description of socialist ideology (hereinafter referred to as Soviet 
ideology) which legacy is important to understand the development of political 
scene in the former socialist countries.
It should be noted that for a long time drastic differences in ideology did 
not permit Western and Soviet researchers to approach the matters pertaining to 
ideology and democracy in a similar way. Soviet scholars proceeding from the 
Marxist theory were always critical about Western research traditions while their 
Western counterparts representing the non-Marxist traditions spoke in a critical tone 
evaluating Soviet studies. Both sides tried to stress those features of each others’ 
systems they thought of as negative and different from their theory and practice. 
This, of course, failed to contribute to a fruitful scientifi c discussion.
New right interpret equality as equality of opportunity in economic terms. In 
case market is operating effi ciently inequality of outcome is not only tolerable but 
also necessary and even desirable. Freedom from this perspective is a freedom for 
individuals to compete in the economy. Democracy is only a secondary (and not 
very effective or representative) indicator of consumer demand. Friedman (1962) 
argues that capitalism maximizes economic freedom and that this in turn promotes 
political freedom, to choose and make decisions about one’s life. The notion of 
democracy is important only to allow governments to legitimize their attempts to 
preserve the status quo in which individuals are freed from the power of the state 
in the organization and public and private life.
For social democrats equality and equity are seen as valuable in their own 
right as a means of encouraging social integration, diminishing social confl ict and 
pursuing social justice. Therefore, freedom can never be absolute in a libertarian 
sence since to ensure that freedom means the same thing to all citizens some kind 
of actions should be limited. The route to balancing equality with liberty is rooted 
in democracy.
At present this is the market model that attracts most political legitimacy and in 
many areas of social welfare most public support. It promotes an ideology of limited 
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inequality which supposedly increases individual incentive and nurtures the work 
ethics as opposed to equality that might undermine initiative in the market. As a result. 
employment tends to be accepted as a criterion of distribution of social benefi ts. 
Many scholars note that social policy issues discussed, for example, at the European 
Union (the EU) level are evidently dominated by employment considerations. This 
implies a gradual shift from broad social citizenship understanding of equality to 
equality of opportunity and overcoming social exclusion or, briefl y, from welfare 
to workfare.
Equality in the Soviet ideological tradition was understood in terms of social 
status rather than in purely distributional terms.
All individuals were regarded equals as members of society. It was presumed 
that they all worked if they were able to and satisfi ed their needs even in case they 
could not work; actively participated in public life; possessed equal civil rights and 
bore equal responsibilities. The ultimate principle of justice of communist society 
was expressed in the maxim “to everyone- according to his needs, from everyone 
-- according to his abilities”.
Equity was major concern of Soviet scholars mainly because of economic / 
property considerations. Since the means of production were in public ownership 
all people were equal in relation to it. They were considered to be co-owners of 
enterprises and possessors of equal rights to outcomes of their activities.
Employment fi gured prominently in the concept of socialist social justice 
which implied:
· equal position in relation to means of production;
· securing employment for every economically active person;
· remuneration in accordance with labor input.
In the post-Soviet period the ideological debates stress economic effi ciency 
considerations fi rst and are mostly concerned with securing the economic growth. 
Inequality is regarded as a part of the package of incentives and is therefore seen less 
as an incentive for individuals to work harder to improve their own circumstances 
rather than a problem in itself. Whereas a lot has been said about how much social 
benefi ts cost to the society much less is mentioned about positive effects of such 
spending, for example, on people’s
The role of the (welfare) state
Market economy is based on inequality and certain state interventions aimed 
to redistribute resources in the society are necessary to promote equality. The 
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country needs economic and social policies to compensate for the unsatisfactory 
outcomes of market system.
Social democracy is based on criticism of inequalities and ineffi ciencies that 
market inevitably generate and reproduce. Nevertheless most advocates of this 
approach accept the context of a capitalist economy in the belief that the detrimental 
effects of the market can be ameliorated if not transformed through the state 
intervention. Reforms can be achieved without altering the fundamental structure 
of the capitalist economy. Emphasizing equality, social democrats explicitly aim to 
create greater equality within capitalist society and are essentially concerned with 
promoting equality of opportunity. They accept that capitalism can be gradually 
transformed into a society in which citizens are equal.
Excessive inequalities are unjustifi ed and they should be reduced. But what 
constitutes acceptable or unacceptable inequality? Taking wealth or income for 
example, there is no agreement on the dividing line between acceptable and the 
unacceptable equality. These are matters to be decided not a priori but in the 
democratic process of policy. There are however some agreed policy guidelines 
that are followed in the developed nations, namely minimum income, minimum 
wage, redistribute taxation policies.
Social democrats put an emphasis more on reduction of power inequality 
between individuals than on the reduction of economic inequalities. They believed 
it can be promoted by welfare state policies, in particular by education as it bears 
potential for both reinforcing social stability and traditional values and at the same 
time providing opportunities for social mobility and social change.
There is a number of reasons why equality is necessary in a civilized society. 
First, it secures social cohesion while excessive inequality may lead to confl ict and 
social breakdown. Second, it is regarded as a means to promote social effi ciency 
on the assumption that excessive inequality reduces social mobility and hinders 
the creation of a meritocracy, and that market economies misallocate resources by 
responding only to demand and not to need. Third, if inequality denies some of 
their natural rights, equality is viewed as a route to social justice. Fourth, equality is 
regarded as a means of self realization while inequality is thought to prevent many 
less powerful individuals from realizing their full potential. Equality is viewed both 
as a social right per se and as a means of achieving other social goals (extension 
of freedom, sense of altruism and social obligation).
But who should benefi t from the wealth generated by the national economy. Not 
only economic growth is important but how it is diffused to individuals and families. 
The society moral obligations to the poor and move towards a more integrated 
society are important justifi cations used to promote the greater equality.
There is also a debate concerning whether even if accepted as desirable a 
strategy of equality could succeed as a recent common challenge both from the left 
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and the right is that it is impossible to achieve equality embedded in the welfare 
state ideal.
The debate about equality and welfare state was originally concerned with 
issues of class and income. The belief that government social programmes would 
reduce class inequality has been challenged by several investigators. Some also 
claimed that access to social services remains highly inequitable. Recently the 
debate broadened to include gender and ethnicity.
The research into the impact of government social programmes has also 
examined the extent to which these programmes have affected social equality. As 
they expended in the industrial countries during the 20th century many assumed 
that these programmes would reduce social inequalities, that access to health care, 
education, housing and social security would help to promote greater equality.
Over recent years there have been a reassertion of the ideology of inequality 
as those in traditionally privileged positions claw back the gains made by less 
privileged groups during the 1960s-1970s. The more powerful and advantaged 
groups in the society can effectively use the resources at their disposal to preserve 
their privileged position.
This tendency has been increasingly evident in recent years. The offi cial 
doctrine of progressivity in taxation is still in place but it is weakened by lowering 
of the top tax rates in this era of economic rationalism and tax revolts. Moves to 
privatization and cuts of government expenditures as well as other policies favoring 
the market magnify the tendency of government activity to benefi t the already 
blessed.
This fact raises the debate of what the notion of equality means and whether 
its achievement is, in fact, the aim of the state. Confl icting views on the problem 
are very well illustrated by Le Grand versus Powel discussion.
Le Grand in his infl uential “Strategy of Equality” (1982) distinguished fi ve 
types of equality: equality of public expenditure, equality of fi nal income, equality 
of use, equality of cost, equality of outcome. Proceeding from the premise that the 
objective of the welfare state was to promote equality he came to the conclusion 
that “the strategy of equality through public provision has failed” (Le Grand, 1982: 
151). Welfare state can not overcome the basic inequality on which the capitalist 
system is based and failed to reduce social inequality. The middle class has better 
access to government social programmes and receives better standards of service 
than the working class.
Powell (1995), on the contrary, argued that, fi rst, equality should not be defi ned 
in distribution terms only and, second, reaching equality might not be an objective 
of the welfare state. He stated that in fact the aim of the welfare state was to secure 
a minimum standard of living.
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The Soviet ideology acknowledged that social equality could not be fully 
achieved in socialist society as it was a lower stage of communism. Some 
inequalities were explained by the specifi c historical background ( Engels noted 
that the perception of justice itself was a product of historical development) and 
by the lack of resources society had to satisfy all needs of all people. Differences 
between social groups were expressed, for example, in income status dependent of 
distribution according to work. The importance of material stimuli was admitted, 
especially in 1970s-1980s when the rate of growth of the national economy 
decreased.
The aggregate means allocated by socialist society for consumption by 
population were divided – as suggested by Marx in the “Critique of the Gotha 
programme”-- into:
wages/salaries;
public consumption funds (PCF) consisting of centralized funds accumulated 
in the state budget via taxation system and decentralized funds formed at 
enterprises.
Centralized public consumption funds were set up to promote equality between 
members of society by enabling them to fully realize their potential abilities as 
inequalities arising from distribution according to labor input rather than needs, 
differences in family status and personal abilities could not be eliminated through 
personal income. Through public consumption funds those needs were satisfi ed 
that were considered important from the point of view of society. They were 
excluded from individual choice based to a large extent on individual income. 
These funds covered services which were regarded as fundamental for the whole 
society as distinct from purely individual needs dependent on income and choice 
of an individual.
It was argued that combination of goods and services distributed individually 
according to labor input (wages/salaries) and collective provision of services to all 
people regardless of their income status through public consumption funds by health 
care system, educational, cultural, recreation and sport institutions, construction 
of housing, etc., as well as cash payments to support the disabled, the elderly and 
children (pensions, stipends, family benefi ts) was the most effective and effi cient 
way to meet needs of all members of society.
The communist countries were ideologically, constitutionally and 
organizationally committed to promoting welfare of their citizens. It should be noted 
that low income inequality did not mean that the communist countries had no class 
system. A well established system of privileges favor party offi cials, government 
offi cers. However, these privileges often have more social rather than income value, 
meaning fi rst of all better access to goods and services. One should also remember 
that industrial workers employed in large factories enjoyed not less privileges.
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In this context occupational welfare was incremental as it was available only to 
those in employment and sometimes their dependants. However, as its existed side 
by side with the state system of social protection that covered all social risks and all 
citizens, the employed could get social services through two systems, namely, the 
state and enterprise, often duplicating each. To solve the arising principal ideological 
problem of fi nding arguments to justify such a situation the idea of a preferential 
treatment of workers was put forward. As the social and economic status of any 
stratum of population was measured by its contribution to development of economic 
basis of the new society those people who contributed more to welfare of society 
were to be rewarded more. Industrial workers came the fi rst on the list as the main 
productive force. It was considered to be just especially because workers input to 
the growth of the national economy would in the end enable all citizens to benefi t 
through public ownership on means of production.
well being. Is it all about fi nancial matters only or there is a place for changing 
attitudes?
The today experience of the former socialist countries demonstrates three 
more things. First, it turned out that democracy can not be achieved from the 
spot—it requires effort and commitment on the part of the state, that should promote 
democratic values. But it should be remembered that one of the basic democratic 
values is choice and the society can vote for inequality for whatever reason. The 
American dream phenomenon is a good example here. Second, the longer the legacy 
of the Soviet ideology the less state capture seems to be (compare CIS and Central 
Europe). Third, one of the hot issues in analyzing inequality and the attitude to it in 
society is the origins of wealth and poverty, especially in the CIS, where allegedly 
many fortunes were gained by not very honest means.
Conclusions
Our brief analysis demonstrated that ideological factor might have a potential to 
explain the rise in inequality in the former socialist countries against the expectation 
that as they are moving into democracy inequality should decrease. In a modern 
society inequality is linked to a complex of political and institutional factors rather 
than democracy per se.
The right see achieving economic and social equality as economically and 
socially damaging and thus doomed to failure. They only believe in equality of 
opportunity that in fact means equality of access. Social democrats, on the contrary, 
regard inequality as economically and socially damaging and wasting society’s 
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resources as well as socially divisive. They want to see reductions in inequalities 
and promote the real equality of opportunity that requires a whole range of economic 
and social policies. They are concerned with the removal of socially destructive 
inequalities rather than the advancement of equality.
Social status was as valuable or even more valuable in socialist countries 
than income status that was not approved by people. Therefore, as former socialist 
countries are on the move from egalitarian (socialist) to unequal (capitalist) society 
the rise in inequality should not come as a surprise. Another problem is degree of 
inequality and why it differs between the countries. We suggest that Soviet type 
elite in introduction of a market economy translated their power and social status 
into power and economic capital.
However, though there are quite clear and sharp divisions between ideologies 
on the issue of equality and inequality both ideologies are built upon the notion 
of market that is unequal per se. The increase in inequality as well as country 
variations in the former socialist countries might be explained by an evident shift 
towards market-oriented ideologies that imply a certain degree of inequality from 
egalitarian socialist/communist one with lower degree of inequality.
Former socialist countries are developing democratic societies, at least in terms 
of political mechanisms used. But in a democratic society inequality is legitimate as 
a value and democratic political mechanisms can produce and often legitimate some 
of the major patterns of inequality, or democratic inequality. Translated into practical 
policies, equality has never been an aim of the reforms carried out in transitional 
economies. The reform rhetoric is concerned fi rst of all with formation of market 
economy. Liberal economic policies adopted by many former socialist countries 
strengthen vertical and horizontal inequality ( the latter through accumulation of 
wealth by market dominant groups). One can speak about a principal shift in policy 
-- to control inequality rather than fi ght for equality.
Cuts in government expenditures that in some countries go along with renewed 
economic growth is another issue. But what matters is how economic gains are 
distributed to various population groups in the society. Unprecedented economic 
and political changes have a major impact of welfare in the region and social 
conditions deteriorated during this period. The gap between rich and poor has rapidly 
increased along with the collapse in production and the spread of poverty. Other 
things being equal, growth leads to less reduction in poverty in unequal societies 
than in egalitarian ones. Therefore, it is necessary to increase the share of growth 
that accrues to the poor. The role of the state seems important in this case.
The case of the former socialist countries also highlights the importance to 
understand the national social and cultural traditions. While the experience of 
Central and Eastern European countries is highly infl uenced by the European 
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political tradition Central Asian states demonstrate the modifi cation of oriental 
political tradition and its peculiar adjustment to the modern challenges.
To our mind, two propositions need further investigation. First, why Soviet 
type elites change their ideological preferences almost overnight and Soviet 
egalitarian political ideology was replaced by the almost opposite approaches, 
probably refl ecting the general trend towards inequality in developed countries. 
Second, what might be the measures governments in the former socialist countries 
should undertake to address the raising inequality.
Table 1
DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME-- GINI COEFFICIENT
 1989
 
1993 1995 1996 1998 1999 2000 2001
Check Republic 0.198 0.214 0.216 0.230 0.212 0.232 0.231 0.237
Check Republic - - - 0.258  - - -
Hungary 0.225 0.231 0.242 0.246 0.250 0.253 0.259 0.272
Hungary - 0.307 0.312 - - - - -
Poland 0.275 0.317 0.321 0.328 0.326 0.334 0.345 0.341
Slovakia - - - 0.237 0.262 0.249 0.264 0.263
Slovenia - - 0.264 0.252 0.243 0.248 0.246 -
Estonia 0.280 - 0.398 0.370 0.354 0.361 0.389 0.385
Latvia 0.260 - - - 0.330 0.330 0.327 -
Lithuania 0.263 - - 0.347 0.332 0.343 0.355 0.354
Bulgaria 0.233 0.335 0.384 0.357 0.345 0.326 0.332 0.333
Romania 0.237 0.267 0.306 0.302 0.298 0.299 0.310 0.353
Albania - - - - - - - -
Bosnia - - - - - - - -
Croatia 0.360 - - - 0.350 - - --
Macedonia - 0.273 0.295 0.311 0.308 0.308 0.346 0.334
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Serbia - - - - 0.289 0.273 0.373 0.378
Belarus 0.229 - 0.253 0.244 0.253 0.235 0.247 0.245
Moldova 0.251 - - - - - 0.437 0.435
Russia 0.265 0.409 0.381 0.375 0.374 - - -
Russia - 0.441 0.439 0.501 0.446 - 0.432 0.422
Ukraine 0.228 - 0.470 - - 0.320 0.363 0.364
Armenia 0.251 - - 0.420 - - - -
Azerbaijan 0.308 - - - - - 0.301 0.373
Georgia 0.280 - - - 0.503 - - 0.458
Kazakhstan 0.281 - - - - - - -
Kyrgyzstan 0.270 - - - 0.411 0.399 0.414 0.377
Tadjikistan 0.281 - - - - 0.470 - -
Turkmenistan 0.279 - - - 0.209* 0.262* - -
Uzbekistan 0.280 - - - - - - -
* earnings not income
Source: UNICEF (2003) p.94
Table 2
INCOME INEQUALITY IN RUSSIA
 1992 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
i n c o m e , 
total















2nd 11.6 10.2 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4
3rd 17.6 14.8 14.8 14.7 14.8 15.0
4th 26.5 21.6 21.2 20.9 21.2 21.7
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5th 38.3 47.5 47.6 47.9 47.6 47.0
5th to 1st 
ratio
8.0 13.5 13.8 14.0 13.8 13.8
Gini 0.289 0.401 0.399 0.400 0.399 0.396
Source: Sotzialnoye polozeniye i uroven’ zhizni 2002: p.130
Table 3












        
C h e c k 
Republic
1996 10.3 14.5 17.7 21.7 35.9 25.4
Hungary 1998 10.0 14.7 18.3 22.7 34.4 30.0
Poland 1998 7.8 12.8 17.1 22.6 39.7 31.6
Slovakia 1992 11.9 15.8 18.8 22.2 31.4 19.5
Slovenia 1998 9.1 13.4 17.3 22.5 37.7 28.4
        
Bulgaria 1997 10.0 13.9 17.4 21.9 36.8 26.4
Romania 1994 8.9 13.6 17.6 22.6 37.3 28.2
        
Belarus 2001 7.9 12.8 17.2 22.9 39.2 30.5
Ukraine 2001 6.8 12.0 16.5 23.0 41.7 34.0
Russia 2001 5.9 10.4 15.0 21.7 47.0 39.6
Moldova 2001 6.6 10.9 15.1 21.5 46.0 37.9
        
Latvia 1998 7.6 12.9 17.1 22.1 40.3 32.4
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Estonia 1998 7.0 11.0 15.3 21.6 45.1 37.6
Lithuania 1996 7.8 12.6 16.8 22.4 40.3 32.4
        
Kazakhstan 2001 6.3 11.0 15.9 22.9 43.9 34.8
Kyrgyzstan 2001 5.0 9.4 14.3 21.7 49.7 44.1
Turkmenistan 1998 6.1 10.2 14.7 21.5 47.5 40.8
Source: Sotzial polozeniye i uroven’ zhizni 2002. P 427
Table 4






















C h e c k 
Republic
32 1996 4.3 10.3 35.9 22.4 5.2 3.5 25.4
Hungary 38 1998 4.1 10.0 34.4 20.5 5.0 3.5 24.4
Poland 35 1998 3.2 7.8 39.7 24.7 7.8 5.1 31.6
Slovakia 39 1996 3.1 8.8 34.8 20.9 6.7 4.0 25.8
Slovenia 29 1998 3.9 9.1 37.7 3.0 5.8 4.1 28.4
Estonia 41 1998 3.0 7.0 45.1 29.8 10.0 6.5 37.6
Latvia 50 1998 2.9 7.6 40.3 25.9 8.9 5.3 32.4
Lithuania 45 2000 3.2 7.9 40.0 24.9 7.9 5.1 36.3
Bulgaria 57 2001 2.4 6.7 38.9 23.7 9.9 5.8 31.9
Romania 72 2000 3.3 8.2 38.4 23.6 7.2 4.7 30.3
Albania 95 - - - - - - - -
Bosnia 66 - - - - - - - -
Croatia 47 2001 3.4 8.3 39.6 24.5 7.3 4.8 29.0
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Macedonia 60 1998 3.3 8.4 36.7 22.1 6.8 4.4 28.2
Serbia          
Belarus 53 2000 3.5 8.4 39.1 24.1 6.9 4.6 30.4
Moldova 108 2001 2.8 7.1 43.7 28.4 10.2 6.2 36.2
Russia 63 2000 1.8 4.9 51.3 36.0 20.3 10.5 45.6
Ukraine 75 1999 3.7 8.8 37.8 23.2 6.4 4.3 29.0
Armenia 100 1998 2.6 6.7 45.1 29.7 11.5 6.8 37.9
Azerbaijan 89 2001 3.1 7.4 44.5 29.5 9.7 6.0 36.5
Georgia 88 2000 2.2 6.0 45.2 29.3 13.4 7.6 38.9
Kazakhstan 76 2001 3.4 8.2 39.6 24.2 7.1 4.8 31.2
Kyrgyzstan 102 2001 3.9 9.1 38.3 23.3 6.0 4.2 29.0
Tadjikistan 113 1998 3.2 8.0 40.0 25.2 8.0 5.0 34.7
Turkmenistan 87 1998 2.6 6.1 47.5 31.7 12.3 7.7 40.8
Uzbekistan 101 2000 3.6 9.2 36.3 22.0 6.7 4.0 26.8
Source: Human development report, 2002. P. 282-284.
Table 5
DEMOCRATIZATION RATINGS
 Democratization scores Corruption score
 1991/2 1997 2003 2003
Check Republic 2.20 1.50 2.00 3.50
Hungary  1.50 1.81 2.75
Poland 2.20 1.50 1.63 2.50
Slovakia 3.40 3.80 1.81 3.25
Slovenia 2.30 2.00 1.75 2.00
Estonia 2.30 2.10 1.94 2.50
Latvia 2.30 2.15 1.94 3.50
Lithuania 2.30 2.15 1.88 3.50
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Bulgaria 6.50 3.99 3.13 4.25
Romania 5.50 3.95 3.25 4.50
Albania 4.40 4.70 3.94 5.00
Bosnia 6.60 na 4.31 5.00
Croatia 3.40 4.20 3.44 4.75
Macedonia 3.40 3.90 3.94 5.50
Yugoslavia 6.50 na 3.50 4.63
Belarus 4.40 5.90 6.63 5.50
Moldova 5.40 3.90 4.38 6.25
Russia 3.30 3.80 4.88 5.75
Ukraine 3.30 4.00 4.50 5.75
Armenia 5.50 4.70 4.69 5.75
Azerbaijan 5.50 5.60 5.31 6.25
Georgia 2.20 4.70 4.69 5.75
Kazakhstan 5.40 5.30 6.13 6.25
Kyrgyzstan 5.40 4.65 5.63 6.00
Tadjikistan 3.10 6.20 5.50 6.00
Turkmenistan 6.50 6.94 6.94 6.25
Uzbekistan 6.50 6.35 6.56 6.00
Median  3.95 3.94 5.00
Average  3.97 3.93 4.78
Source: Freedom House, 2003.
* Ratings and scores are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level and 7 
representing the lowest level of democratic development.
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Table 6
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP)
 1990 1991 1995 1999 2000 2001 2002
C h e c h 
Republic
60.1 54.2 44.1 43.0 44.2 45.2 47.8
Hungary 57.5 52.1 52.6 44.8 46.0 43.0 53.5
Poland 39.8 49.0 49.2 43.9 42.6 45.2 45.7
Slovakia 60.1 54.2 45.2 43.3 45.4 47.7 50.2
Slovenia 49.6 41.1 43.4 44.5 44.1 44.3 43.5
Estonia 32.8 31.8 41.5 42.7 38.6 37.8 39.2
Latvia 44.0 31.0 41.5 44.1 42.0 37.6 37.5
Lithuania 49.2 38.7 36.8 40.2 33.2 31.4 29.3
Bulgaria 65.9 45.6 41.3 41.6 42.4 37.4 38.9
Romania 39.3 38.7 34.7 35.6 35.1 34.6 33.6
Albania 62.1 61.9 33.4 32.7 31.4 31.5 31.0
Bosnia - - 39.3 69.5 66.4 61.3 55.0
Croatia - 39.0 44.9 49.7 48.8 46.0 51.5
Macedonia - 40.4 39.0 35.4 34.2 40.6 37.8
Serbia - - - - 40.1 42.8 48.7
Belarus - 43.9 43.0 46.4 44.3 31.3 42.0
Moldova - 24.7 39.6 36.4 30.2 27.4 31.5
Russia - - 40.2 38.4 35.8 35.8 37.0
Ukraine 31.44 41.0 37.8 36.1 36.4 36.6 -
Armenia  28.0 28.9 30.1 25.9 23.9 20.8
Azerbaijan  40.7 22.5 23.6 20.8 19.9 23.5
Georgia  33.0 12.3 22.1 19.4 18.2 18.1
Kazakhstan 31.4 32.9 20.8 23.1 22.8 22.4 21.9
Kyrgyzstan 36.3 30.3 42.1 35.8 29.9 28.0 28.3
Tadjikistan - 49.6 20.8 16.6 15.2 16.3 15.6
Turkmenistan - 38.2 23.1 19.4 25.3 24.4 24.5
Uzbekistan - 49.7 38.7 32.0 30.4 32.5 25.8
Source: UNICEF, 2003.
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